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ABSTRACT In this paper, we study the consequences of the 2000-2001 financial 
crisis in Turkey to identify the impacts of the crisis on capital and labor. We uncover 
three significant empirical effects of this crisis. First, international capital benefited from 
the crisis by both increasing its total assets in Turkey and income flows from these 
assets, while large domestic financial capitalists also increased their profits in the 
aftermath of the crisis. Second, industrial capital benefited via a repression of labor. 
Third, the attempt to ‘remedy’ the economy by imposing structural changes furthered the 
interests of capital in general.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The 2000-2001 financial crisis in Turkey is one among many crises that characterize the 
current international financial system (Eichengreen, 2001). While this crisis has generated a 
vast literature discussing its causes1, comparatively little attention is paid to its effects. This 
paper remedies this neglect by examining the differential impacts of the Turkish crisis on 
capital and labor through an analysis of economic indicators, a review of institutional and 
structural changes, and various pivotal policy choices. Instead of an abstract general theory 
or a predominantly statistical analysis (for examples of the latter, see Diwan (2000, 2001), 
Jayadev (2005), or Onaran (2007)), we emphasize the analysis of the political processes and 
various economic tendencies at work in a country beset by a financial crisis.  
In general, we find that the consequences of the Turkish financial crisis of 2000-2001 
were largely beneficial to capital, to the detriment of workers. Amongst capitalists, the 
impacts of the crisis differed for both international and domestic capital, as well as financial 
and industrial capital. We largely focus on the impacts for international capital, which was 
able to increase its total asset base in the economy as well as the income flow it receives. 
However, large domestic financial capital also managed to increase its profits in the 
aftermath of the crisis, and domestic industrial capital benefited insofar as real wages were 
reduced and the power of the labor movement declined (although it appears to have been 
hurt by the crisis in other respects). Finally, a number of consequences ensued from the 
structural changes imposed after the financial crisis, most of which were generally beneficial 
for capital. These reforms were broadly in line with the Washington Consensus: an acceleration 
of the privatization process, an increased regressive taxation, Central Bank independence, a 
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[virtually exclusive] focus on inflation, increasing flexibility in labor markets, the 
liberalization of the agricultural sector, and so on. 
Of course, labor and capital are not homogeneous entities, thus the benefits and 
costs of the Turkish financial crisis differed according to various characteristics of both 
capital and labor. Our examination of the consequences of the crisis for capital largely 
focuses on the impacts on ‘international capital’, by which we mean capitalists which operate 
on a world-scale, including international financial capital and multinational and transnational 
firms. Of course, international capital does not always cooperate, have the same interests, or 
gain equally from crisis situations, but we do not attempt a detailed breakdown of their 
potentially divergent interests. “Domestic financial capital” and “domestic industrial capital” 
(collectively referred to as domestic capital) are analyzed broadly, although these concepts 
are refined where the impact of the crisis differs between sub-sections of domestic capital 
and can be empirically distinguished. The relationship between domestic capital and its 
international counterpart is complex and contradictory – at times they are in competition 
(such as when domestic firms cohabit with multinationals in a given market), and sometimes 
they share common interests (in terms of their relationship with the working class, for 
example). Some specific capitalists may arguably be both domestic in some respects and 
international in others. 
Just as we use broad categories for capital, we do not distinguish between various 
groups of workers, despite the likelihood that different strata within the working class have 
different interests. In Turkey, the differences between formal and informal; and public and 
private employment could be particularly important.2 Similarly, we do not analyze the 
situation of peasants or the rural sector in any detail.  
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We view the state as a locus of struggles, as each of these groups pursues its 
preferred policy options. Our analysis of the consequences of the crisis assesses both the 
extent to which the Turkish state lost its autonomy vis-à-vis international capital and other 
creditors and the extent to which it favored one domestic group or the other. While this first 
objective may sometimes give a nationalistic flavor to the argument, we are only concerned 
with the ability of the state to mediate the interests of domestic classes relative to those of 
foreign entities. 
Finally, we see the IMF as being broadly allied to international capital, given their 
strong commonality of views, the revolving door between the Fund and international 
financial institutions, the degree to which the IMF’s support of the Washington Consensus is 
advantageous to international capital, and the likelihood that the IMF sides directly with 
international capital in periods of financial crisis (e.g., Bhagwati, 1998; Stiglitz, 2002; Wade, 
1998; Wade & Veneroso, 1998). To the extent that policymaking retains some importance 
within the current international financial system, the influence of the IMF on domestic 
policy choices makes it an important structural component of that system.  
While our analysis concerns Turkey, we believe that several of our conclusions may 
have a large degree of generality. The way in which the Turkish government has embraced 
policies benefiting international capital, as well as the role played by the IMF, appears 
instructive.  Moreover, not only is labor disproportionately harmed by the crisis, but it is also 
attacked on multiple fronts through various governmental policies, revealing that there is 
some degree of agency involved in addition to impersonal economic processes. Overall, the 
varied dimensions through which international capital may gain from the Turkish crisis 
suggests that crises play a supportive role in the current capitalist system and that  
international capital may profit from them.  
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This is consistent with the argument that current international financial arrangements 
should be viewed as a form of ‘new imperialism’: the creation of conditions that enable 
international capital to increase its wealth and power over developing economies (Duménil 
& Lévy, 2003 and Harvey, 2003). Duménil & Lévy (2006) and Crotty & Lee (2001) provide 
vivid case studies of this new imperialism in Argentina and South Korea, while Ruccio 
(1991) argues that new imperialism is facilitated by stabilization policies. Similarly, Yeldan 
(2007) argues that the Turkish economy has been placed under the control of agents of new 
imperialism in the post-crisis era. Wade (1998), Wade & Veneroso (1998), and Stiglitz (2002) 
offer a scathing indictment of the degree to which governments of leading industrialized 
countries as well as the IMF act on behalf of international capital. Several empirical studies 
suggest that international financial crises hurt labor disproportionately (e.g. Diwan, 2000, 
2001; Jayadev, 2005; Onaran, 2007).  
 
2. 2000-01 Financial Crisis in Perspective 
 
The 1990s were unstable times for the Turkish economy. Following the capital account 
liberalization in 1989, Turkey experienced a ‘boom-bust’ cycle with annual growth oscillating 
between 9.3 percent and -5.5 percent of GDP. Average growth rates were low, annual 
inflation was above 60 percent for the entire decade (sometimes reaching more than 80 
percent), and the government ran large budget deficits (Akyüz & Boratav, 2003). Rather than 
easing government borrowing, capital account liberalization forced the government to offer 
higher spreads relative to the dollar assets which were freely availably following 
liberalization. Real interest rates on government debt soared; creating arbitrage opportunities 
for private banks to exploit the difference between the high rates on government securities 
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compared to foreign borrowing and domestic deposits (Akyüz & Boratav, 2003). Rising 
interest rates forced the government to borrow to meet interest payments (which had 
reached 75 percent of tax revenues by the end of the decade). Finally, the combination of 
high interest and inflation rates and an open capital account exacerbated volatility in financial 
markets, including an important crisis in 1994. 
In cooperation with the IMF, Turkey designed in 1998 a stabilization program to 
reduce inflation (IMF, 1998). The IMF and domestic policy makers attributed inflation to 
large budget deficits, so the stabilization program included strategies for debt reduction, 
notably an ambitious privatization scheme.3 To facilitate foreign ownership, a constitutional 
amendment allowing international arbitration for contracts between the state and foreign 
investors was passed (IMF, 1999a). The government also pledged to keep capital flows free 
from any restriction and to refrain from intensifying trade restrictions (IMF 1999a, 1999b). 
The government announced it would curtail spending via a reduction in labor costs and a 
reform of social programs; wages of public sector employees were to be frozen in real terms, 
while the financing and accessibility of important social programs, such as social security, 
was cut (IMF, 1999b). 
In contrast with the efforts to attain budgetary balance, however, banking laws were 
amended to force the Savings Deposits Insurance Fund (SDIF)4 to recover any insolvent 
banks for restructuring or liquidation, while it was forbidden to provide liquidity to any bank 
not under its full control (IMF 1999b). Following some financial disruptions on the eve of 
the financial crisis, the SDIF was given full authority to borrow as needed from the Treasury 
and full protection was even granted to the creditors and depositors of domestic deposit-
taking banks (IMF 2000c), ostensibly to restore confidence in the program. These two 
measures would eventually prove so costly that they exceeded the savings garnered from 
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restraint on the fiscal front, including the large revenues from privatization. Thus while 
social spending and public wages were capped, investors were guaranteed full reimbursement 
for any loss incurred.  
The stabilization program was implemented starting in December 1999. The 
program was framed around a crawling peg designed to move with anticipated inflation, and 
it rapidly experienced strains as price increases outpaced expectations. However, virtually 
every other target was met, and both government officials and IMF staff proclaimed they 
were satisfied with the program’s progress (IMF, 2000a, 2000b) and Turkey earned praise 
from international financial analysts for its stabilization policies. Nonetheless, the currency 
kept appreciating in real terms and signs of trouble eventually culminated in a flight from the 
currency in November. The last week of November alone witnessed a $5.3 billion outflow as 
a result of short-term speculative operations, causing a severe liquidity shortage in domestic 
financial markets and sending overnight interest rates as high as 2,000 percent. The outflow 
of capital was halted and devaluation fears allayed only after the IMF granted $7.5 billion in 
additional support (Yeldan, 2002).  
The respite was short-lived; in February 2001, a new wave of capital outflows led to 
the collapse of the economic program. Jittery investors pulled $5 billion out of Turkey on 
February 19th alone. The foreign exchange reserves of the central bank, standing at less than 
$20 billion, were at a risk of being depleted. As policymakers attempted to maintain the 
managed exchange rate regime amidst financial turmoil, overnight interest rates soared to 
several thousand percent. This impeded the government’s ability to raise money, and the 
devaluation of the Turkish lira seemed inevitable. When the pegged exchange rate system 
was abandoned, the lira immediately depreciated about 30 percent against the US dollar 
(Orhangazi, 2002). In the aftermath of the February crisis, inflation started increasing again, 
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government debt as a percentage of GDP had nearly doubled, and interest rates were still 
high (Akyüz & Boratav, 2003).  
Without attempting a complete assessment of the IMF program, it is evident that it 
failed to achieve its stated purposes: to reduce inflation, real interest rates, and government 
debt. Moreover, the crisis occurred in the context of an absence of any controls on capital 
flows, during a privatization drive, with tight fiscal policies, a state commitment to take over 
any bank becoming insolvent, as well as an implicit guarantee on the loans made to domestic 
banks. This policy environment affected the outcome of the crisis to a great extent.  
 
3. Impacts of the Crisis on Capital 
 
International capital emerged largely unscathed from the crisis, thanks to protections 
introduced that guaranteed foreign investments at public expense. In fact, international 
capital increased its assets, notably via foreign direct investment and external debt, which 
subsequently increased income repatriated from Turkey. Moreover, while a number of 
domestic banks went insolvent during the crisis, their losses were also covered by the public. 
Large domestic banks even benefited from the crisis thanks to increased interest income. 
Finally, following the crisis, the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) sought to 
deter future instability by accumulating greater foreign exchange reserves, which created an 
additional burden that indirectly benefited international capital.  
  
3.1 External Debt and Protection of Finance Capital 
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The IMF stabilization program included a crawling peg designed to devalue the currency in 
line with targeted inflation. As inflation targets were unattained, the Turkish Lira became 
increasingly overvalued during 2000 (IMF 2000a, c). This encouraged Turkish banks to 
increase their short-term external debt by about 28 percent in 2000 (IMF, 2000b, 2000c; 
Akyüz & Boratav, 2003), despite serious attempts by the state to restrict external borrowing, 
notably through high reserve requirements for external positions exceeding a preset ceiling. 
By the end of 2000, the total external debt was 59 percent of GDP, compared to 47 percent 
only two years before.  
 
<TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE> 
 
Heavy foreign borrowing in search of short-term arbitrage gains arguably 
contributed to the flight from the currency in November 2000 and the February crisis. 
However, the stabilization program had included amendments to banking laws that 
prevented the provision of liquidity to distressed banks. Thus the government was forced to 
wait until financial institutions were technically insolvent before taking action (IMF, 1999b). 
These legal restrictions, as well as a new law protecting creditors and depositors of deposit-
taking banks, forced the government to take over several troubled banking institutions and 
assume the entirety of their liabilities. Since a large portion of the liabilities of these 
distressed banks was denominated in dollars, the government was obliged to borrow heavily 
abroad to honor its commitments. According to a report by the Banking Regulation and 
Supervision Agency of Turkey (BDDK), the government spent $47.2 billion to bail out the 
Turkish financial system, including $25.3 billion to rescue private banks (BDDK 2003). 
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Table 1 presents external debt indicators as a percentage of GNP between 1996 and 
2005. Total external debt reached record levels during and after the crisis, and only leveled 
off around 2005, after 4 years of increased debt servicing and relatively higher GNP growth. 
While most of this increase in total external debt was public external debt5, this is in large 
part a result of the nationalization of private debt via the bank bailouts.  
 
<FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE> 
 
<FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE> 
 
 While it offered an arbitrage opportunity for investors who bid against the currency, 
the devaluation itself was very costly to the government. The day before the devaluation, the 
government sold $5 billion to banks at the lower exchange rate (CBRT). Interest rates rose 
to triple digits while the government fought to maintain the peg, thereby increasing the 
implicit and explicit liabilities of the government and the strain on private institutions. 
Overall, the crisis led the government to borrow an amount equivalent to 17 percent of 
GNP, an increase of 66 percent in its foreign liabilities (Table 1). A large portion of these 
funds came from the IMF (Figure 1), including an unprecedented loan of almost 9 billion 
SDRs. In that year alone, the amount owed by the government to multilateral agencies nearly 
doubled, increasing from $11.4 billion to $22 billion (CBRT).  
 
<FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE> 
 
 10 
This large increase in foreign indebtedness drained domestic resources for debt 
repayment and interest charges. The level and duration of the commitment is illustrated in 
Table 1, which presents the total level of debt servicing costs in terms of GNP, and Figures 
1, 2, and 3, which focus on the public debt situation. The total cost of external debt servicing 
reached 17 percent of GNP following the crisis and still exceeded pre-crisis levels three years 
later (Table 1). Total interest charges on the public debt actually surpassed tax revenues in 
2001, an increase of more than twenty percent from the previous year (Figure 3).6 This debt 
service burden is a long-term economic drag: five years after the crisis the interest charges 
paid to the IMF still have not diminished (Figures 1 and 2). What is more, it was incurred 
largely to reimburse foreign financial institutions through the bailout of the domestic 
institutions that had borrowed from them. This shifted the entire cost of this foreign 
indebtedness on the domestic population at large.  
Perhaps more importantly, Turkey was effectively pushed into debt peonage. The 
burden of international debt commitments provides the IMF and other important 
international creditors with leverage vis-à-vis government policymakers, both at the moment 
the money is lent and as long as the debt overhang persists. In this case, there indeed seems 
to have been a loss of government autonomy, which along with the large interest burden, 
effectively came in large part in exchange for a bail out of international capital.7 It would be 
hard for international capitalists to ask for a better deal. One of the ways in which this loss in 
autonomy seems to have played out is through the quick enactment of laws that considerably 
reduced the risk borne by international capital when the stabilization program started 
experiencing troubles in November 2000. Specifically, the full guarantee of loans made to 
Turkish banks, combined with the necessity for the SDIF to take over any insolvent bank 
(IMF, 1999c, 2000c), amounted to a nationalization of the debt of all financial institutions 
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facing the risk of being unable to service it. An IMF country report prepared in the 
aftermath of the crisis praised the government for putting the governmental guarantee on 
private banks’ liabilities on ‘firmer legal grounds’ (IMF 2001b: 16). Consequently, these loans 
became risk free and the entire cost of the adjustment in domestic financial markets was 
shifted to the domestic population. The only way international capital could lose was via its 
portfolio and direct investments, which were not given the same level of protection. We 
show the overall gain in these sectors below.  
These developments had mixed impacts on domestic capitalists. In some respects, 
they benefited from policies forced on Turkey thanks to the leverage that international 
capital held over the government. But while some legal and policy changes clearly benefited 
domestic capitalists, some of which we review in sections 4 and 5 below, other 
developments may have been less favorable. For example, restrictions on foreign investment 
were eased in various sectors at a moment when domestic capital was not in a good position 
to compete. The fact that the portion of the banking sector owned by foreigners went from 
being marginal before the crisis to 38.8 percent in 2006 (CBRT 2007: 27) may be a direct 
result of the timing of these policy changes. 
 
3.2 Acquisition of Domestic Assets and Income Outflows 
 
Increased economic fragility together with a financial crisis creates opportunities for 
international capital to penetrate the domestic economy. Otherwise solvent companies 
experiencing temporary problems may be forced to liquidate some of their assets at relatively 
low prices. Similarly, the disarray in domestic financial markets may put local companies at a 
disadvantage compared to the affiliates of multinationals, whose relationship with the parent 
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firm gives them more reliable access to credit.8 Via direct acquisition of assets or the 
expansion of the activities of existing affiliates, the financial crisis could offer international 
capital the occasion to take a greater hold of the economy.  
 
<FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE> 
 
As has been the case in other financial crisis (Duménil & Lévy, 2003; Harvey, 2003; 
Wade & Veneroso, 1998), international capital seized the opportunity afforded by the 2000-
2001 crisis in Turkey. Net foreign direct investment (FDI) increased markedly after the crisis 
(Figure 4).9 After a spectacular jump in 2001, which was largely linked to the privatization 
that had occurred in the telecommunication sector the previous year10, FDI went on an 
upward trend and even surpassed 2001 levels in 2005. While FDI may consist of many 
components (such as intra-company loans, equity capital, and greenfield investment), 
evidence suggests that it was largely mergers and acquisitions, much of it in turn linked to 
privatizations. For example, some of the financial assets recuperated by the SDIF were sold 
back to foreign investors, notably Demirbank (a large private domestic bank, which was 
acquired by HSBC in 2001). Assuming a delay between the moment when the deals were 
struck and when the actual payments were made, as happened with the telecommunication 
industry, much of this FDI can be seen as the acquisition of productive assets by 
international capital while the Turkish economy was still in the thralls of the financial crisis.   
This pattern in the rise in FDI following the crisis conformed to IMF expectations. 
While praising the government’s efforts when it approved a new law “implementing the 
constitutional amendment on international arbitration enacted in 1999” right after the crisis, 
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IMF officials noted that “it may take some time before FDI responds to the improved 
macroeconomic environment” (IMF, 2001b, p. 17).  
 
<FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE> 
 
<FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE> 
 
The investment inflow following the crisis soon generated an outflow of repatriated 
profits, which increased to record levels in 2003 and 2004 and show no sign of subsiding 
(Figure 5). Likewise, portfolio income has reached unparalleled heights since the crisis, rising 
from negligible amounts in 1999 to $1.2 billion two years after the crisis.11 A similar pattern 
can be observed for portfolio income following the previous financial crisis in 1994, when it 
suddenly rose from nothing to more than $700 millions within a year, although the increase 
was more short-lived than for the 2000-2001 crisis. Finally, as expected, net interest outflow 
has also risen since the crisis, peaking at $4.35 billion in 2001 and remaining higher than pre-
crisis levels thereafter (Figure 6).12 These measures suggest that many profitable investment 
opportunities were seized by international capital during the 2000-01 financial crisis. This 
enabled international capital to increase its clout over the economy, both by acquiring 
existing firms and enlarging market shares, but also to secure a large wealth transfer for the 
years to come in the form of repatriated profits, portfolio income, and interest payments.  
 
3.3 Precautionary Cost of the Crisis 
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Reserves accumulated to deter future financial troubles represent a more insidious drain on 
the country’s resources. We refer to the necessity of maintaining these additional 
international reserves as a precautionary cost. Before a devaluation, attempts to support the 
currency imply a major expense of reserves, which then translates into a direct capital loss if 
these efforts fail. Since the liberalization of the capital account in the late 1980s, Turkish 
reserves have exhibited a steep upward trend, especially after the 1994 financial crisis (Figure 
7). From a low-point of $5 billion during the 1994 crisis (which was still higher than at the 
time of the liberalization), reserves had ballooned to over $45 billion ten years later. Reserves 
accounted for 47 percent of public foreign debt in mid-2005. These reserves represent net 
resource drains on the Turkish economy; they finance the governments that issue the reserve 
currency. Stiglitz (2002, p. 66) illustrates the costs associated with the holding of foreign 
reserves:  
 
To manage risks associated with these volatile capital flows, countries are routinely advised to set aside 
in their reserves an amount equal to their short-term foreign-denominated loans. To see what this 
implies, assume that a firm in a small developing country accepts a short-term $100 million loan from 
an American bank, paying 18 percent interest. Prudential policy on the part of the country would 
require that it would add $100 million to reserves. Typically reserves are held in US Treasury bills, 
which recently paid around 4 percent. In effect, the country is simultaneously borrowing from the 
United States at 18 percent and lending to the United States at 4 percent. The country as a whole has 
no more resources available for investing. American banks may make a tidy profit and the United 
States as a whole gains $16 million a year in interest. But it is hard to see how this allows the 
developing country to grow faster. Put this way, it clearly makes no sense. There is a further problem: 
a mismatch of incentives. With capital market liberalization, it is firms in a country’s private sector 
that get to decide whether to borrow short-term funds from American banks, but it is the government 
that must accommodate itself, adding to its reserves if it wishes to maintain its prudential standing.  
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Hence reserves act as an insurance policy, for which Turkey pays a fee to the issuer 
of the reserve currency. As such, it gives issuers of reserve currencies an interest in the 
perpetuation of systemic instability to compel ‘developing’ countries to continue to 
accumulate reserves. Thus governments of industrialized countries have a common interest 
with international capital insofar as both benefit from the consequences of international 
financial instability. Added to the fact that international capital has vast resources to lobby 
these governments and that public officials often come from its midst, this may explain why 
they often adopt policy stances which seem in line with the interests of international capital 
(Wade, 1998; Wade & Veneroso, 1998). 
 
<FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE> 
 
3.4 Gains of Domestic Capital 
 
While international capital seems to have profited from the crisis overall, large portions of 
domestic finance capital have also improved their position. In December 2000, between the 
November 2000 shock and the February 2001 crisis, “some TL 3.8 quadrillion in treasury 
securities were issued to recapitalize private banks taken over by the SDIF” (IMF, 2001b, p. 
10). Following the crisis, the government covered the losses of private banks: “By end-April 
2001, the total public sector debt required to cover these losses and provision for additional 
nonperforming loans amount[ed] to an estimated [TL] 13.7 quadrillion. This amount does 
not include the loss in market value of treasury bills currently held by SDIF banks” (IMF, 
2001b, p. 10). The rationale for this bailout was presented by the IMF as “to stabilize 
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confidence in the financial system at a moment of severe crisis, and thereby contain the risk 
of wholesale capital flight” (IMF, 2001b, p. 22). The gains of the large banks during and after 
the crisis is well summarized by the same IMF report: “... the financial condition of most of 
the largest and some small commercial banks, altogether representing nearly half of the 
commercial banking system, has been strengthened as a result of exceptionally high earnings 
during the recent crises episodes” (IMF, 2001b, p. 12).  
 In addition, some banks even benefited from the crisis thanks to increased interest 
income. For the whole banking sector, the net interest income as a percentage of total assets 
varied between 6 and 10 percent in the five quarters preceding the crisis (CBRT, 2005, p. 
117). This ratio reached almost 18 percent during the crisis and stayed around that level for 
four quarters. Banks did report negative earnings on average during the crisis, but the 
profitability of the banking sector as a whole had recovered by the first quarter of 2002 
(CBRT, 2005, p. 113).13  
However, the recovery in profitability was most vigorous for the biggest banks 
(CBRT, 2005, p. 114), while small banks were under particular strain.14 This created 
opportunities to transform the domestic banking sector in favor of larger banks. Smaller 
banks that became insolvent could be acquired by larger banks thanks to the government-
orchestrated bail-outs. This enabled large banks to eliminate some of their smaller domestic 
competitors. Hence the 10-bank concentration ratio increased from below 70 percent in pre-
crisis years to almost 80 percent by the end of 2001, and further increased thereafter (CBRT, 
2005, p. 54).  
Although large corporations in the non-financial sector saw their net income as a 
percentage of total assets decrease from 4.2 percent in 2000 to -2.3 percent in 2001, they 
quickly recovered and this ratio reached 3.8 percent in 2002 and 6.2 percent in 2003 (CBRT, 
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2005, p. 33). This is not to say that there were no problems in the sector – FDI patterns 
suggest that at least some firms were ripe for acquisition. In fact, the increase in repatriated 
profits shows that foreign capitalists benefited from the recovery, either via the firms they 
owned directly or their partnerships with domestic corporations.  
 
4. Crisis and Labor 
 
The 2000-01 crisis imposed a heavy burden of adjustment. Economic activity slowed down 
considerably, the financial system was disrupted, and the crisis itself proved very onerous for 
the government.  While some sectors – such as bank creditors – fared well, the burden of 
adjustment appears to have been borne largely by workers and the beneficiaries of social 
programs. The taxation system became increasingly regressive and the real wages and the 
labor share decreased markedly after the crisis (Figure 10 and Table 2). All in all, we find that 
the crisis shifted the balance power in favor of capital. This case is not unique in this respect; 
there is increasing evidence that financial crises generally hit labor more harshly than capital 
(Diwan 2000, 2001; Jayadev, 2005). 
The changes in real wages and the labor share around the time of the crisis are 
symptomatic of the shift in the balance of power between labor and capital. The difficult 
post-crisis economic conditions, such as an unemployment rate that exceeded 10 percent 
following the crisis and stayed at that level afterwards (Table 2), gave capitalists a lever to 
undercut labor’s bargaining power. At the same time, the government cut the wages of 
public employees and froze the real wages of civil servants (IMF, 1999b). These policies and 
the increasing unemployment both reflected a worsening of workers’ fall-back options. An 
active income policy to reduce wages was also implemented in the aftermath of the crisis 
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(IMF, 2001b, p. 21). This policy was carried out under the euphemism of “strengthened 
social dialogue to promote wage moderation and social protection” (IMF, 2001b, p. 21).  
Meanwhile, organized labor was also losing ground. The number of unionized 
workers decreased by about one-sixth in 2001 alone, after having been on an upward trend 
for the preceding five years (Table 2). The annual number of workdays lost in strikes, a 
direct indicator of labor militancy, had also been slowly trending up in the five years before 
the crisis. It decreased abruptly by a factor of 7 from 2001 to 2002. This conjuncture resulted 
in major wage concessions: in 2001, real wages experienced a decline of about 19 percent 
(IMF, 2001b, p. 21).  
 
<TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE> 
 
This outcome is not unique to the 2000-2001 financial crisis. While data on the 
general level of hourly wages only cover the period between 1993 and 2002, data on real 
hourly wages for production workers in manufacturing span over a much longer period, thus 
illustrating the evolution of real worker remuneration. Just as the general real wage level fell 
after the 2001 crisis, there was a decrease of about 30 percent in real hourly manufacturing 
wages following the 1994 financial crisis (Table 2). Manufacturing wages then stayed around 
that level until 1999, when they increased by about 10 percent, only to drop again by 15 
percent in 2001 (a pattern which closely resembles that of the general wage level). The data 
for real hourly wages in manufacturing beyond 2002 indicate that they have not yet 
recovered from the combined impacts of the two financial crises. The labor share displays a 
pattern similar to that of real wages. After dropping to 22 percent as a result of the 1994 
financial crisis from a pre-crisis level of 31 percent, it steadily increased in the ensuing years 
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and even reached 31 percent again in 1999 (Table 2). The labor share then decreased once 
more to 26 percent as a result of the 2000-2001 crisis, a drop from which it still had not 
recovered in 2004. The decline of the labor share is all the more important given that the 
GDP was itself decreased substantially, so that workers ended up with a smaller proportion 
of a much smaller pie.  
  
5. Structural Changes Following the Crisis 
 
The impact of the 2000-2001 financial crisis was also felt in the realm of policymaking. 
While the economy, and especially the external sector, had been gradually liberalized in the 
1980s and 1990s, the government had retained a strong role in managing the economy. 
Then, in response to the macroeconomic turbulence of the 1990s, as well as the 
deteriorating financial position of the government, the IMF was called upon. The 
stabilization program it devised in collaboration with the government made IMF help 
conditional on several reforms in line with the Washington Consensus, such as the privatization 
of several publicly-owned enterprises. However, the 2001 financial crisis acted as a catalyst 
for further neoliberal reforms, which in turn influenced the subsequent relative bargaining 
power of capital and labor.  
The government borrowed a lot of money from the IMF in the course of the crisis 
(Figure 1). Between December 2000 and the end of 2002, the total debt owed to multilateral 
institutions rose from about $8 billion to $31 billion (Figure 8). Five years after the fact, the 
government still owes over $23 billions to these institutions. These funds were urgently 
needed at the time they were borrowed, thus as lender of last resort the IMF had 
considerable leverage vis-à-vis the government’s policy agenda. It was in this context of 
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cooperation with the IMF throughout the crisis that the government nationalized the debt of 
all the insolvent banks while maintaining the country’s complete openness to capital flows. 
After the crisis, the implementation of the policies contained in the stabilization program 
was to be sped up and further neoliberal reforms were introduced.  
 
<FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE> 
 
Prior to the crisis, the IMF was dissatisfied with the pace of privatization. The only 
major privatization that had occurred before the crisis was in the telecommunications 
industry, and even this one had only been partial (Figure 9). The IMF believed that 
“slippages had emerged, partly because of market conditions, partly because of delays and 
less than a full commitment to privatize” (IMF, 2001, p. 17). Following the crisis, the new 
privatization strategy envisaged a “stronger effort on the side of the authorities to put 
Turkey in the best position to privatize its public enterprises” (ibid.). This ‘effort’ included 
the full privatization of Turk Telekom, sale of the state monopolies in  sugar, tobacco, and 
gas sectors, the sale of Turkish Airlines, ERDEMIR (steel), and TUPRAS (petroleum 
refineries); and a privatization of the companies responsible for the generation and 
distribution of electricity (IMF, 2001b, pp. 17, 60). The state also expressed a will to attract 
more FDI in conjunction with this privatization effort (IMF, 2001b, pp. 17, 60). This new 
emphasis did indeed generate more privatizations following the crisis, especially in 2004 and 
2005 (Figure 9).  
 
<FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE>  
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The restructuring of the banking sector following the crisis was a key part of this 
new privatization drive. To preempt objections to the nationalization of failing banks and 
their subsequent (re)privatization, a complete immunity from prosecution was granted to the 
individuals involved in this restructuring (IMF, 2001c). This is a rather exceptional privilege, 
heretofore only awarded to the military – by itself – after the 1980 coup.  
The stabilization program regarded the level of government debt as highly 
problematic. The large-scale privatization effort was envisaged as a solution to that situation. 
However, government borrowing to honor guarantees to foreign investors and support an 
unsustainable peg was seen as acceptable. By the end of 2001, the government was left with 
a debt amounting to 93 percent of GDP, up from 44 percent when the program was 
designed in 1998 (Akyüz & Boratav, 2003). As some other objectives ostensibly trumped 
debt reduction, the discourse evolved and efficiency considerations, rather than government 
financing needs, came to be cited as justification for privatization (e.g., IMF, 2001a), 
suggesting that privatization was in fact an end in itself.  
Government spending grew in large part thanks to the $47.2 billion bailout of the 
financial system. Social spending and labor costs in the public sector were reduced, 
indicating that the government prioritized spending on financial creditors rather than their 
less affluent counterparts. It will be difficult to reinstate social spending, since debt servicing 
costs currently absorb a very large portion of tax revenues (Figure 3). Taxes themselves have 
become more regressive, as the government has increasingly resorted to indirect taxes 
instead of income taxes (see Figure 10). (See IMF, 2001b, p. 18 for a review of fiscal policy 
in the aftermath of the crisis).  
 
<FIGURE 10 ABOUT HERE>  
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The 2000-2001 crisis also provided an impetus for further neoliberal organizational 
changes within the government. In response to the crisis, key amendments were made to the 
law governing the Central Bank to give it formal independence from the government. The 
Central Bank then started pursuing ‘inflation targeting’ as its primary goal.  
We do not wish to suggest that there is a unilateral relationship of subservience 
between the IMF and the government. What we argue is that the crisis has given leverage to 
certain entities, notably the IMF, which has allowed them more power in the contested field 
of policymaking. This resulted in the establishment of policies that were both largely 
neoliberal in their thrust and advantageous to capitalists and affluent groups in general. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
While there has been much written on the Turkish financial crisis of 2000-01, this literature 
has been mostly centered on the underlying determinants of the crisis. Here we shift the 
debate to focus on the consequences of the crisis rather than its roots. In doing so, we argue 
that capital benefited in the aftermath of the crisis, while labor was disadvantaged. We found 
that international capital benefited from the crisis by increasing its total assets in the 
economy as well as the income flows it receives from it, while large domestic financial 
capitalists also increased their profits following the crisis. Second, industrial capital benefited 
via a reduction of real wages and a decline in the strength of the labor movement. Third, the 
structural changes imposed on the economy in the aftermath of the crisis, in order to 
‘remedy’ to the situation, furthered the interests of capital in general by promoting increased 
privatization and changes in public finances, including most notably an increase in regressive 
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taxation. Furthermore, policies associated with neoliberalism, such as central bank 
independence, labor flexibility, the liberalization of agriculture, and so on, have been 
extended and deepened in the economy.  
Our findings provide empirical support to the contention that financial crises could 
be supportive of the current capitalist order, notably the international financial system and 
large financial capitalists. We deem this to be important insofar as it suggests that financial 
crises not only stunt the economic development of the countries they beset, but they could 
also both slant that development in favor of capital and deprive the government of these 
countries of some of their autonomy. Of course, far-reaching inferences cannot be drawn 
from the study of only one country and other financial crises should be analyzed before any 
general conclusion is reached (see, for example, Dufour & Orhangazi, 2007).  
However, our analysis raises an interesting point. In Marxian crisis theory, the 
capitalist system is inherently unstable and prone to crisis. Although there are various 
explanations regarding the reasons behind these crises, the Marxian approach usually sees a 
crisis as setting up the next expansion by bringing wages and interest rates down, devaluing 
capital and preparing the ground for organizational and institutional change. Hence crises 
automatically play the role of “the irrational rationalizer of the economic system” (Harvey 
1999: 305). In the Turkish financial crisis of 2000-2001, even though various sections of 
capital and the capitalist system in general seem to have benefited from the crisis, this was 
not an automatic process per se.  
Rather, this outcome was the result of a combination of impersonal economic forces, 
such as the fact that viable Turkish firms were available at a bargain after the crisis, and 
direct actions taken by various groups, notably important private and public creditors with 
some leverage over policymakers. We believe that the two worked in tandem, insofar as they 
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reinforced each other: While there is some automatism in the functioning of many of the 
economic forces, they more often than not still need some measure of direct action on the 
part of policymakers... actions that would be useless without those forces at work. Coming 
back to the availability of cheap Turkish firms, for example, international capital will only be 
able to secure ownership of these firms if capital flows remain free of any hindrance. One of 
the things that would be interesting to see if the sample of crises is expanded is the extent to 
which each of those two components – economic forces and policymaking – reinforce or 
oppose each other during episodes of international financial crises. 
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 Total External Debt Public Sector Central Bank Private Sector External Debt Service 
1996 43.2 21.9 6.7 14.6 6.2 
1997 43.8 20.2 6.1 17.4 6.5 
1998 46.6 19.2 6.3 21.1 8.0 
1999 55.7 23.0 5.9 26.8 9.9 
2000 59.3 24.3 7.0 27.9 11.0 
2001 78.0 31.6 16.7 29.6 16.9 
2002 71.9 35.2 12.2 24.6 15.9 
2003 60.6 29.1 10.2 21.3 11.6 
2004 54.2 24.7 7.1 22.4 10.2 
2005 47.4 18.9 4.3 24.3 10.1 
 
Table 1: External Debt Indicators as Percentages of GNP 
Source: Treasury External Debt Statistics
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Workdays 
lost in 
strikes1 
Number of 
unionized 
workers2 
Unemployment 
rate3 
Annual 
real wage 
index4 
Annual real 
wage index for 
production 
workers in 
manufacturing5 
Labor's 
share in 
income6 
1991 39,578,374 - 7.9 - 143.4 31.9 
1992 6,754,420 - 8.1 - 147.6 31.7 
1993 4,348,805 - 7.8 100 150.4 30.9 
1994 1,594,949 - 8.1 95.1 119.6 25.5 
1995 20,107,667 - 6.9 75.9 101.1 22.2 
1996 1,386,169 2,695,627 6.0 58.6 97.9 23.9 
1997 1,581,737 2,713,839 6.4 68.3 99.9 25.8 
1998 1,632,726 2,856,330 6.3 65.4 98.1 25.5 
1999 1,645,520 2,923,546 7.7 82.7 108.7 30.7 
2000 1,928,339 3,086,302 6.6 95.5 110.2 29.2 
2001 2,389,008 2,580,927 8.5 77 95.3 28.3 
2002 345,705 2,648,847 10.3 76.7 87.8 26.3 
2003 608,796 - 10.5 - 82.3 26.1 
2004 878,154 - 10.3 - 83.1 26.3 
 
Table 2: Labor Indicators 
Sources: (1) CBRT; (2) Sönmez 2002; (3) Turkish Statistical Institute; (4) Turk-Is Research 
Department (www.turkis.org.tr);  (5) CBRT; (6) OECD Annual National Accounts. 
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Figure 1: Transactions between Turkey and the IMF (million SDRs) 
Source: IMF Country Statistics 
Note: Data for 2006 is only for part of the year.  
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Figure 2: Charges and Interest Paid to the IMF (million SDRs) 
Source: IMF Country Statistics 
Note: Data for 2006 is only for part of the year.  
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Figure 3: Ratio of Interest Payments to Total Tax Revenue 
Source: Treasury External Debt Statistics
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Figure 4: Net FDI in Turkey (million U.S. dollars) 
Source: Central Bank of Republic of Turkey Data Delivery System 
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Figure 5: Net Income Outflows from Foreign Direct and Portfolio Investments(million 
U.S. dollars) 
Source: Central Bank of Republic of Turkey Data Delivery System 
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Figure 6: Net Interest Outflow (in million U.S. dollars) 
Source: Central Bank of Republic of Turkey Data Delivery System 
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Figure 7: Central Bank Foreign Exchange Reserves (million U.S. dollars) 
Source: Central Bank of Republic of Turkey Data Delivery System 
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Figure 8: Outstanding Debt Owed to Multilateral Institutions (Million U.S. Dollars) 
Source: Central Bank of Republic of Turkey Data Delivery System 
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Figure 9: Total Privatization Revenue (million US Dollars) 
Source: Turkish Privatization Administration 
 41 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 
 
Figure 10: Ratio of Indirect Taxes to Direct Taxes 
Source: Treasury Statistics 
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Notes  
                                                 
1 Explanations range from political mistakes, insufficient liberalization and flawed 
IMF-directed policies. See Akyüz & Boratav (2003), Alper (2001), Boratav (2001), Boratav & 
Yeldan (2002), Eichengreen (2001), and Yeldan (2001 & 2002) for an overview of these 
arguments. 
2 See Sönmez (2006) for a discussion of the rise in informal employment; and 
Agénor et al. (2006) for a more formal discussion of rural-urban migration, a large urban 
informal sector, and bilateral bargaining in the formal sector in post-crisis Turkey.  
3 Government finances appeared to have been on an unsustainable path throughout 
the 1990s as interest payments required increased borrowing. However, in terms of its level, 
the public debt was not that high at the beginning of the stabilization program. The public 
debt stood at 36.3 percent of GNP (IMF, 1998) at the outset of the program (42.9 percent 
of GDP at the end of 1997 according to Akyüz & Boratav, 2003), which is around the 
OECD average (e.g. 47 percent in 1997 and 46.6 percent in 2004) (OECD, 2004). Moreover, 
the correlation between the debt (or deficit) and the inflation rate in Turkey in the 1990s is 
not that clear cut (Akyüz & Boratav, 2003, especially Table 1), the assertion made in support 
of the program’s objectives notwithstanding. In this context, it is interesting to see the initial 
stress put around debt reduction, especially in light of the relaxation of this concern later on 
when the financial crisis erupts in Turkey.  
4 The SDIF, which was formed under the Central Bank to provide deposit insurance 
in 1983, was put under the authority of Banking Supervision and Regulation Authority in 
1999. 
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5 We include the debt of both the Central Bank and the consolidated public sector in 
our measure of public debt. 
6 The ratio of interest payment to total tax revenues had been on an upward trend 
throughout most of the nineties, starting right before the 1994 financial crisis, and 
culminated in 2001. Though the jump in 2001 is quite spectacular, the 2000-2001 crisis 
cannot account for the greater part of the interest burden. The root cause of that increase 
should therefore be sought elsewhere, possibly in relation to the 1994 crisis; we simply 
observe that the 2000-2001 crisis sent interest payments through the roof.  
7 For other similar cases of IMF bailouts of international capital in times of crisis 
through an increase of the liabilities of the government of the affected country, see Stiglitz 
(2002). 
8 See Desai, Foley & Forbes (2004) for a detailed layout of this argument. 
9 The level of FDI was still relatively low after the crisis, especially if we compare it 
to countries which have a longer history of foreign investment, such as Mexico (The 
Economist, 2005). However, what is important is that this level of FDI was quite 
extraordinary for Turkey, which is what we believe should be the point of reference, given 
that a host of other factors specific to Turkey determine the level of investment in that 
country. What is also striking is that although the capital account had technically been 
completely deregulated in 1989, FDI only picks up after the 2000-2001 crisis, more than a 
decade later. 
10 In other words, although the deal was struck in 2000, the bulk of the payments 
were made in 2001. We thank Erdal Yılmaz from the CBRT for pointing this out.  
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11 Some of these profits may also have come from the expansion of foreign affiliates 
in Turkey. Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient data to be able to quantify this 
expansion or properly determine the contribution of each process in generating the profits 
subsequently repatriated. Such a differentiation is perhaps superfluous for the general 
argument; however, as an investment cum repatriated profits pattern is clearly identifiable 
from FDI and portfolio data. 
12 Again, the crisis itself does not explain the general rising trend in this variable. 
However, it is important to note that the crisis has caused a significant jump in this ratio and 
it reached record levels right after the crisis.  
13 The rapid recovery following fairly high reported losses makes us wonder whether 
some of these banks took the occasion offered by the crisis to write-off some bad 
components of their portfolio, though we have no evidence either way. 
14 In fact, “the remaining commercial banks [those whose position was not 
strengthened through high interest earnings] have experienced substantial losses from high 
interest rates and the depreciation of the lira” (IMF, 2001b, p. 10). 
